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[Abstract] Does European economic integration create more inequality between domestic 
regions, or is the opposite true? While former research has asked for a general answer to 
this question, we argue that such a general answer does not exist and that the outcome 
depends on the liberalisation scenario. In order to examine this, we need models with 
higher dimensionality where the question is where and not whether there will be spatial 
agglomeration. For this purpose, the paper develops a numerical simulation model with 
nine countries and 90 regions in order to examine the impact of European and international 
integration on the regions. Eastward extension of European integration is beneﬁcial for old 
as well as new members, but within countries the impact varies along the east-west axis. 
Reduction in distance-related trade costs is particularly good for the European peripher-
ies. Each liberalisation scenario has a distinct impact on the spatial income distribution, 
and there is no general rule telling that integration causes more or less agglomeration. 
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1. Introduction* 
 
How does European integration affect domestic regions? This question 
is urgent not only for those directly affected but also for policy makers: 
regional support constitutes a main component of the common policies 
of the European Union. In the 2007-2013 Financial Framework of the 
EU, 36% of total funds is allocated to such “cohesion activities”.1 
While Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain were the main beneficiaries 
of EU regional support during the years preceding the 2004 enlarge-
ment, regions in the new member states have now taken over this role.  
On this background, it is of considerable interest to know 
whether integration as such tends to widen or narrow the core-periph-
ery gaps inside countries. If the latter was to be true, European integra-
tion would by itself be a good regional policy, and the case for budget 
support would be weaker. Ederveen et al. (2006) find that EU struc-
tural funds are only effective in regions that are open or have good 
institutional quality. For EU policy, especially in the context of the EU 
Neighbourhood Policy (see e.g. Dodini and Fantini 2006), an urgent 
issue is whether there is an “agglomeration shadow” whereby regions 
outside the enlarged EU are worse off.  
A growing body of evidence (see e.g. World Bank 2000, 
Römisch 2003, Landesmann and Römisch 2006) suggests that regional 
inequality is on the rise in new member states. According to a recent 
comprehensive assessment (Melchior 2008a) covering 36 countries in 
Europe and beyond, there is no doubt: During 1995-2005, there was a 
substantial increase in domestic regional inequality within all Central 
and Eastern European countries. Given that East-West European free 
trade agreements and EU enlargement has been implemented during 
the last decade, an issue is therefore whether integration as such has 
been a cause for the observed increase in regional inequality. Or is it, 
on the contrary, the case that European integration promotes regional 
convergence within countries?  
 Existing research provides no clear answers about whether 
international integration promotes convergence or divergence between 
domestic regions. In section 2, we review some empirical work as well 
as some recent theoretical contributions within the new economic 
geography (NEG) and conclude that the answer to our main question is 
ambiguous in terms of theory as well as empirics. In this paper, we 
argue that there is no general answer to this question, and searching for 
such a general rule is barking under the wrong tree.  
 As an illustration, some of our results suggest that East-West 
regional integration will have an uneven impact on western and eastern 
regions within former member states and the new members.  In the 
new member states, for example, western regions may be more stimu-
                                                 
* I thank Maryla Maliszewska, Fredrik Wilhelmsson and Konstantin Gluschenko for 
useful comments to an earlier draft. The paper was written as part of the research 
project ENEPO – European Eastern Neighbourhood – Economic Potential and Future 
development. Financial support from EUs 6th Framework programme (contract 
028736) and the Norwegian Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/budget_glance/what_for_en.htm.  
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lated by integration. Whether this contributes to more or less regional 
inequality, depends on the initial pattern of regional inequality. Fur-
thermore, we show that the east-west impact of integration is quite 
different with other forms of international trade integration, for ex-
ample multilateral trade liberalization of the WTO (World Trade 
Organization) type, or reduction in distance-related trade costs (such as 
transport costs). Hence the impact of international integration on 
domestic regional inequality depends on the type of integration as well 
as the initial income distribution. European regions have been affected 
by various stages of European integration, multilateral integration 
through WTO, and reductions in transport costs. We cannot expect that 
all these forms of integration have similar effects on domestic regions. 
In order to address such integration effects, we should not only 
ask whether there will be spatial agglomeration of economic activity, 
but where this agglomeration will be. Will international integration 
stimulate growth in the north, south, east or west of a country, or its 
central areas? In order to address such issues, we need models of suffi-
cient dimensionality: with a sufficient number of countries, and with 
distinct regions within each country. In trade theory and the new eco-
nomic geography (NEG), the issues have mainly been addressed using 
low-dimensional models with three or four regions (see Section 2 for 
references). Many questions about European integration and domestic 
regions can however not be addressed within such models. Concluding 
their survey of the new economic geography (NEG), Fujita and Mori 
(2005) consider the development of higher-dimensional spatial models 
as one of the top priorities for future research in the field.2  
The ambition in this paper is therefore to develop a higher-di-
mensional model for the study of European integration, in order to 
highlight the issue and develop a platform for empirical work in the 
field. In this way, we try to move from economic geography to geo-
graphical economics, by developing a model that is directly applicable 
to the empirical analysis of spatial development patterns in Europe. As 
another contribution in a related field, Stelder (2005) uses a large-scale 
NEG model to examine the location of cities in Europe. Except for this 
contribution we are not aware of similar large-scale models, although 
some regional CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) models may be 
partly related although these are mainly focusing on the national level 
only (see e.g. Bröcker and Schneider 2002). Multi-regional modeling 
has certainly been used also in the NEG context; see e.g. Fujita et al. 
(1999), but then mainly to answer questions about “whether” there will 
be agglomeration. In the current paper, we extend this by focusing 
more on the “where” question, and derive implications that can be ap-
plied to the map and used directly in the empirical study of geographi-
cal patterns of change in Europe. For example, we ask whether inte-
gration will have different impact in the west and in the east, within 
Europe as a whole and within each country.  
                                                 
2 The authors list four priority areas, and the others were; (i) unifying urban 
economics and NEG, (iii) better modeling and empirical understanding of transport 
costs and how it affects agglomeration, and (iv) exploring the impact of spatial 
knowledge spillovers. 
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 In Section 2, we survey some recent research in the field. In 
Section 3, we discuss and motivate the theoretical modeling approach 
chosen and define the integration scenarios to be examined. We pre-
sent the technical properties of the theoretical model and examine the 
behaviour of the model in a low-dimensional setting, before proceed-
ing to the higher-dimensional numerical simulations. In section 4, we 
present the results from the modeling of various stages of regional and 
international integration affecting European regions.  Some concluding 
remarks are presented in Section 5.  
 
2. International integration and domestic regions: Some recent 
research 
 
The new economic geography (NEG) (see Ottaviano and Thisse 2004 
or Fujita and Mori 2005 or Fujita et al. 1999 for overviews, or Puga 
1999 for a synthesis of some core models) provides a new micro-foun-
dation for examining regional inequality. Some NEG contributions 
have also examined the relationship between international integration 
and domestic inequalities. In models of economic geography there is 
typically a centrifugal force working against agglomeration, and a 
centripetal force promoting a more uneven core-periphery pattern. 
Appearing in various shapes and embedded in different models, the 
standard engine for agglomeration is often the so-called “home market 
effect” demonstrated by Krugman (1980): Industries with economies 
of scale and imperfect competition tend to be located where market 
access is better. In Krugman (1980) it was the home market that cre-
ated better market access, but it may also be a more favourable geo-
graphical location.   
If workers are allowed to migrate in response to real wage dif-
ferences, as in Krugman (1991), it amplifies market size differences, 
and regional inequality will increase. In this model, the centrifugal 
force is that workers in the “agricultural” sector are immobile and 
maintain an incentive to locate firms close to peripheral demand.  Al-
lowing labour to migrate between domestic regions but not interna-
tionally, it may then be studied how migration and domestic agglom-
eration is affected by international trade integration. Within such a 
framework, Paluzie (2001) and Monfort and Nicolini (2000) find that 
international liberalisation makes domestic agglomeration more likely. 
Monfort and Ypersele (2003) obtained similar results in a model with-
out labour migration but with vertical linkages between industries. It is 
well known in the new economic geography literature (see e.g. Puga 
1999) that the NEG labour migration model and the model with verti-
cal inter-industry linkages of Krugman and Venables (1995) produce 
rather similar results.  
The results outlined above are derived in models where domes-
tic regions are symmetrically placed related to foreign countries or 
region, so there is no geographical core-periphery pattern. Crozet and 
Sobeyran (2004) also examined the asymmetric case where one do-
mestic region is closer to the outside world.  Now the conclusion about 
integration and regions is reversed: International integration promotes 
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development in the border region.3 A similar conclusion was obtained 
by Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996), who replace the centripetal 
force working against concentration: When agglomeration is damp-
ened by domestic congestion costs instead of immobile farmers, inter-
national integration also leads to less domestic concentration.4 
 What is the intuition behind these results? International integra-
tion makes intra-national trade less important and this weakens the 
forces for concentration as well as for dispersion:  
 
- It weakens the “monopoly” of the domestic core region by facilitat-
ing the periphery’s trade with the outside world, and this may pro-
mote convergence. The intuition may also be expressed as follows: 
It is borders that create the backwardness of some border regions, 
and when borders are made less important, domestic core-periph-
ery patterns are weakened.  
- On the other hand, increased demand from abroad also strengthens 
the incentive for agglomeration. In models where domestic real 
wage differences are ruled out since they lead to labour migration, 
international integration is then more likely to produce agglomera-
tion. 
 
From the still limited amount of theoretical research on this issue, it is 
therefore ambiguous whether international integration promotes con-
vergence or divergence between domestic regions.  
This ambiguity also applies to empirics.  Some evidence indicates 
that international integration leads to more inequality: Summing up the 
results from a large-scale United Nations research project, Kanbur and 
Venables (2007, 209) conclude that “trade has on balance increased 
spatial disparities”. Hanson (see e.g. Hanson 2003) has examined the 
impact of NAFTA on wages in Mexico and found that integration led 
to greater regional wage dispersion but a gain for more skilled labour 
close to the U.S. border.5 Egger et al. (2005) found that export open-
ness increased regional inequality with respect to real wages in Central 
and Eastern Europe. This evidence is important; it is however not a 
direct test of the mechanisms described in the theoretical models 
above.  
On the other hand, there is also evidence suggesting that inter-
national integration promotes regional convergence:  
 
                                                 
3 Another contribution considering spatial asymmetries, regions and international 
trade is Behrens et al. (2006). Using a model with two countries each having two 
regions, they show, among other things, how the probabilities of agglomeration in the 
two countries are interdependent.   
4 See also Alonso-Villar (2005). Behrens (2003) also shows that some of these results 
depend on the Dixit-Stiglitz modelling approach where the firms’ mill prices are 
unaffected by trade costs and changes in competition. If changes in competition lead 
to changes in prices, the share of trade costs in total costs may change, and this may 
change the results. 
5 According to Aroca et al. 2005), it was stagnation in South Mexico rather than 
prosperity in North Mexico that caused the divergence in incomes. 
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- Crozet and Soubeyran (2004) interpret their evidence about labour 
migration in Romania as support for the hypothesis that European 
integration has been to the advantage of border regions, as pre-
dicted by their model.  
- Redding and Sturm (2005) found that the division of Germany dur-
ing 1945-1990 had a particularly negative impact on border re-
gions; thus indicating that disintegration contributed to stronger 
core-periphery pattern. They also found signs of recovery for bor-
der regions after reunification. 
 
Hence also empirically, some contributions suggest convergence and 
others divergence.6 Based on earlier research, the impact of interna-
tional integration on domestic regions is therefore ambiguous theoreti-
cally as well as empirically. 
 Except for the border region of Crozet and Soubeyran (2004), 
the theoretical models referred to above are essentially similar to trade 
bloc models containing three or four regions, with a limited spatial 
structure. It is therefore of interest to examine the issue in models 
where geographical location and distance plays a larger role. In order 
to obtain this, one needs greater dimensionality. Melchior (2000), us-
ing a 49-region multilateral version of the home market effect (HME) 
model of Krugman (1980), distinguishes between “spatial” trade costs 
(such as transport costs) and non-spatial trade costs (such as tariffs) 
and found that “spatial liberalisation” tends to promote more centrali-
sation, while reductions in non-spatial trade costs tend to have the op-
posite effect. The distinction between spatial and non-spatial trade 
costs is also examined by Behrens et al. (2007), who study agglomera-
tion effects with gated regions, and it will be an important element in 
the modelling undertaken here. Spatial trade costs allow the forces of 
geography and distance to work properly, while non-spatial costs allow 
the modelling of countries and trade blocs. When the two types are 
combined, one generally obtains effects that are distinct from those 
that apply with each of them alone.  
 
3.  The modeling approach 
 
3.1. A synthetic European space 
 
In the theoretical analysis, we use a two-dimensional rectangular grid 
of 9 countries divided into 90 regions. Diagram 1 illustrates this “syn-
thetic” European space: 
 
                                                 
6 Some research focuses on other variables; e.g. that international integration 
promotes more similar export structures; see Beine and Coulombe (2007)and  Crespo 
and Fontoura (2007). 
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Diagram 1: A stylised European space with 90 regions
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In the diagram, each dot represents a region of equal size in terms of 
population or labour force. Eight of the countries have nine regions 
each, while the last North-East country, E3, has 18. While the map is 
highly stylized, the idea is to capture aspects of the true European 
space. The four countries W1-W4 to the left represent the “old EU” or 
Western Europe whereas C1-C2 represent the “new members” or Cen-
tral Europe. Eastern Europe is represented by E1-E3, of which one 
(E1) is a large, long and narrow country which is meant to capture 
some dimensions of Russia. E2 could in terms of geographic position 
resemble Turkey or Ukraine and E3 might represent Eurasian countries 
further east. The 90-region landscape has distinct North-South and 
even more East-West dimensions; there is a sufficiently rich regional 
structure inside each country, and we have a sufficient number of 
countries to study different integration scenarios, and their impact on 
insiders and outsiders.7  
The map in Diagram 1 captures some aspects of the true European 
space but we should nevertheless be aware of the limitations: 
 
- There is no outside world so the model will tend to overestimate 
the isolation of regions at the borders of the landscape. Given that 
e.g. regions in the Russian Far East is now benefiting from more 
intensive trade with China, USA and others, this is a limitation.  
- The landscape is stylized and misses many features of true geogra-
phy, which has more countries, oceans, lakes, mountains, climatic 
differences and so on. For example, the results for “W1” may not 
be appropriate in order to assess the impact of European integration 
on Nordic regions. The North-South dimension is limited and al-
lows limited analysis of e.g. EU enlargement towards the South 
                                                 
7 Before choosing this format, we also experimented with a more geographically 
realistic approach using up to more than 500 regions, using true regional map 
coordinates. It is however an illusion that the model is much more realistic even if the 
coordinates are true: After all, it is only theory. With a more stylised landscape, it is 
easier to interpret the results and we avoid some technical computation problems that 
are present in models with larger scale and variable region size. 
 11
and North. This is a deliberate choice since our focus here is par-
ticularly on the East-West dimension. 
 
Neary (2001, 551) also calls for two-dimensional extensions of NEG 
models but fears they will be “long on trigonometry and short on ele-
gance”! With a richer landscape it is inevitably the case that the effects 
and results are also more complex. By choosing the rectangular grid 
rather than true geography, it is nevertheless easier to see the principal 
results in a stylized way. In order to show how the core model affects 
the results, we shall also proceed in two steps, by exploring the model 
properties in a low-dimensional setting before proceeding to the 90-
region landscape. 
 
3.2. Scenarios and trade costs 
 
A core feature of the approach used here is that we include some trade 
costs that are a function of distance, and others that are independent of 
distance. We call the first spatial trade costs, and the second non-spa-
tial. As shown by Melchior (2000); when the two types are present 
simultaneously one obtains effects on the spatial distribution of activity 
or incomes that are not present when each is considered in isolation.
 We may think of spatial trade costs as transport costs, but it 
could also be the case that policy-shaped barriers or regulations have a 
spatial dimension. For example, if geographical distance also reflects 
institutional similarity it could be that standards and regulations are 
more similar in countries and regions that are close to each other and 
their protective impact could then be correlated with distance. The re-
lationship between transport costs and distance is also not straightfor-
ward: while e.g. the costs of road transportation in Europe may be mo-
notonously increasing with distance, this may not be so clear for long-
distance sea freight. Similarly, we may think of trade policy barriers as 
non-spatial and this is certainly the case for e.g. a Most-Favoured Na-
tion (MFN) tariff applying to all countries. But if countries form trade 
blocs with their neighbours only, there may also be a correlation be-
tween trade policy barriers and distance. In the analysis here, trade 
costs represent distribution costs in general, and it is an empirical issue 
which trade costs are spatial and non-spatial. In the European context, 
the European internal market is a large-scale project containing thou-
sands of reforms, of which some may be spatial and others non-spatial. 
 In the model simulations, trade costs always include a spatial as 
well as a non-spatial component: 
 
- Spatial trade costs are present within as well as between nations. 
We use the notation dij=βd*Dij/Dmax. Here Dij is the “geographical” 
distance in Diagram 1; varying from one between adjacent regions 
up to the maximum, Dmax≈14.03.  We divide by Dmax so the right 
hand side ratio is maximum equal to one. βd is a scaling factor, 
which we use to scale up or down the magnitude of spatial trade 
costs.  
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- We assume that there are non-spatial trade costs present between 
all regions, also within nations. We use three levels; within nations 
(tdomestic), between regions in different nations but within the same 
trade bloc (trta, where the rta subscript refers to some regional trade 
agreement), and between regions in different nations that have 
made no special integration agreement (tmfn, where mfn refers to 
Most Favoured Nation). We always assume tdomestic<trta<tmfn and for 
simplicity we let the level for regional integration be mid-way be-
tween the domestic and MFN barriers. If we had allowed 
tdomestic=trta countries would not exist any more. Since international 
trade costs are always higher than the domestic ones, countries 
continue to matter in all scenarios.   
 
We will simulate the following ten scenarios: 
 
1. A base case without any regional integration agreements (BASE). 
The results are not reported in detail, but it is used as a yardstick 
for comparing the results of regional integration. 
2. Western integration (WEST): A regional integration agreement is 
formed among the four countries to the west (W1-W4). This is 
meant to represent the earlier stages of integration in Western 
Europe.  
3. Iron curtain (IRON): Prohibitive barriers are erected between 
WEST countries and the rest. By reversing the sign of the predicted 
effect, we check the impact of the fall of the iron curtain.  
4. West-Central integration (WIDER): The Central European coun-
tries C1 and C2 are added to the regional integration scheme. This 
intended to capture aspects of the eastward extension of European 
integration; through various free trade agreements and finally EU 
enlargement. 
5. Multilateral integration (WTO): We examine the impact of changes 
in tmfn, with no changes in the other trade cost components. This 
sheds light on the impact of multilateral liberalization and also 
“preference erosion” whereby the intra-European preference mar-
gin is reduced. 
6. Eastern integration (EAST): We examine the impact of integration 
between the three countries to the east; E1-E3. This may be rele-
vant for discussing the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as 
current integration efforts within CIS (the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States). 
7. Reduced transport costs (SPATIAL):  We examine the impact of 
reduced spatial trade costs, while all other trade costs remain un-
changed. In this way, we check how regions could be affected by 
the “death of distance”, or more realistically a reduction in its 
costs. 
8. Further eastward extension of integration (EAST-WEST): E2 joins 
the regional integration agreement and we examine the national 
and regional impact. This could be relevant for assessing further 
EU enlargements or free trade agreements to the South East, e.g. 
with Ukraine or Turkey. 
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9. Unilateral liberalization in the East (EASTOPEN): We explore the 
impact of unilateral liberalization in an eastern country (E2). In this 
case we simulate the outcome with initially trade costs higher than 
tmfn; and the impact of reducing these to tmfn. Transition and WTO 
membership have led to a significant reduction in trade costs in 
some Eastern European countries, and this scenario is intended to 
capture such changes.  
10. Capital region dominance (CAPITAL): In Central and Eastern 
Europe there has been faster growth in capital regions and a poten-
tial explanation is that some nations have a hub-and-spoke pattern 
where the capital is a hub. We try to capture this by assuming that 
half of the trade of regions in the three eastern countries E1-E3 has 
to pass through their capital. We may think of this literally as if 
goods have to be transported via the capital, or – perhaps more 
plausibly – that other aspects of distribution and sales are related to 
the capital. In order to model this, we designate capitals based on 
the outcome of earlier simulations and recalculate the matrix of 
trade costs. We use the three eastern countries as illustrations, but 
have no à priori prediction about where such capital hub effects are 
relevant. Brülhart and Koenig (2006) tested what they called the 
“Comecon hypothesis” and found that for wages and service em-
ployment, capital regions in five of the new EU member states 
(with respect to the 2004 enlargement) were better off. Hence this 
scenario may potentially be relevant also for Central European 
countries. In Melchior (2008a) it is shown that higher regional ine-
quality invariably corresponds to a larger income gap between 
capital regions and the country average, and this applies to Central 
as well as Eastern European countries. 
 
3.3. The choice of model 
 
Models of the new trade theory and NEG are well-suited for our pur-
pose since in such models, industrial location or income levels are af-
fected by market access. The archetype version of this argument is the 
“home market effect” (HME) model of Krugman (1980): In this 
model, large countries tend to be net exporters with respect to a 
“manufacturing” sector with scale economies, monopolistic competi-
tion and trade costs. While most models of the new trade theory and 
NEG have shared this focus on net export effects, Krugman (ibid.) 
demonstrated that market access could alternatively show up in the 
form of nominal wage differences rather than net trade effects. In their 
survey of empirical work on the new economic geography, Head and 
Mayer (2004, 2663) conclude that the relationship between market 
access and wages is more robustly supported than the relationship be-
tween market access and the structure of production. Empirical re-
search therefore strengthens the case for models with endogenous 
wages rather than net trade effects. In this paper, we therefore depart 
from Krugman’s idea about nominal wage effects and develop a mul-
tilateralised version which we call the “wage gap model”. In the analy-
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sis, we compare this to a multilateral version of the HME model and 
argue that the wage gap model is indeed a plausible alternative. 
 A multilateral version of the HME model was applied to the 
analysis of spatial inequality by Melchior (1997, 2000) or more re-
cently Behrens et al. (2005, 2007).8 In the multi-region setting, the 
HME model has the advantage of simplicity: It has a simple matrix-
form solution so numerical exercises can be carried out with little 
technical difficulty. Hence the model has some of the virtues requested 
by Fujita and Mori in their quest for developing high-dimensional 
models (2005, 396); “A most desirable model would be one that has 
solvability at the low dimensional setup and computability even at the 
fairly high dimensional setup.” The drawback, however, is that for the 
HME model, a solution with positive production in all regions only 
exists within a restricted range of parameter values. Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, Chapter 10.3) showed that even in the two-region 
case, the range with positive production in both regions is limited in 
the HME model. In the case with many regions, this problem is se-
verely aggravated. The implication for numerical modeling is that the 
model is “sustainable” only for quite high levels of trade costs, limited 
region size differences, and a high elasticity of substitution. This se-
verely limits the applicability of the HME model in high-dimensional 
modeling. Another limitation of the HME model is the somewhat arbi-
trary assumptions about the numeraire sector. This sector is sometimes 
referred to as “agriculture”, but it is empirically not very plausible that 
there is completely free trade for agriculture but not manufacturing. As 
shown by Davis (1998) (and discussed further in Fujita et al. 1999, 
Chapter 7), the HME disappears if trade costs are equal in the two 
sectors. 9 In spite of these limitations of the HME model, the model 
demonstrates in an extreme form a powerful mechanism that is present 
also in other models and crucial in the whole NEG literature.  
 Based on these arguments, we choose in this paper to develop 
an alternative model with endogenous wage differences instead of net 
export effects. Following Krugman (1980) and dropping the numeraire 
sector in the HME model, we obtain a model where wage differences 
are driven by differences in market access. Dispensing with sector dif-
ferences and collapsing the economy into one sector, using one sector 
and one factor of production only, we can think of this as a “sector 
average” for the economy. To this we may later add other features: 
Sector differences in trade costs or technology, adding more produc-
                                                 
8 In addition to the “manufacturing” sector referred to above, there is a numeraire 
sector which is freely traded at zero cost and produced with constant returns to scale. 
When labour is the only factor of production, free trade with the numeraire good 
equalizes wages in all regions/countries (provided they all produce that good). With 
no nominal wage differences, any advantage in market access or home market size is 
reflected in larger production in the differentiated goods sector. Since large countries 
obtain a more than proportionate share of production, we obtain the HME effect. 
9 Also if we replace the numeraire sector with another “Dixit-Stiglitz sector” with 
trade costs, the HME effect may disappear and the pattern of specialization and trade 
will depend on differences in elasticities and trade costs across the two sectors. As 
shown by Venables (1999) in a two-dimensional setting (a circular plain), a complex 
“chess-board-like” pattern of alternating specialization may then occur. 
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tion factors and so on. 10 Ideally, we would like to have net trade ef-
fects as well as wage effects simultaneously, but – given the dimen-
sionality of the model – we start with wage effects only.  
 We call this the wage gap model since differences in market 
access are reflected in the form of different nominal and real wages. 
While this is our main approach, we shall also retain the HME model 
as part of the analysis and compare the two models: Are the wage ef-
fects in the wage gap model just a mirror of the net export effects in 
the HME model? As we shall see, this is sometimes but not always the 
case.  
 An alterative choice might have been to use NEG models along 
the lines of Krugman (1991) or Krugman and Venables (1995). While 
these models have some interesting properties, they generally generate 
multiple equilibria and even in the simple two-region case the analysis 
of stability can be demanding. For the purpose at hand, with 90 re-
gions, we deliberately avoid models with multiple equilibria.11 With 
many possible equilibria and no yeardstick to choose between them, it 
may be difficult to evaluate the results coming from numerical simula-
tions. For the purpose of analyzing European regional income distribu-
tions, we are also interested in a model which allows for a continuum 
of possible outcomes rather than catastrophic agglomeration in one 
region. European peripheral regions are generally not empty, but they 
have lower nominal and real incomes and we would like the model to 
capture this. Nevertheless, our choice is mainly for technical reasons 
and an interesting extension might be to develop more multi-region 
application of the NEG models with ad hoc dynamics, labour migra-
tion or externalities.  
 
3.4. Properties of the wage gap model:  Are wage effects and net 
export effects similar? 
 
In Appendix A, the technical details of the model are presented. Here 
we shall illustrate some of the properties of the model. We start by 
examining the model in a low-dimensional setting, before proceeding 
to the 90-region simulations. 
 Some basic properties of the wage gap model are: 
 
- Since there is only one sector in the economy overall trade has to 
be balanced so there is only intra-intra-industry trade.12  
                                                 
10 For example, the model of Markusen and Venables (1998) adds a Heckscher-Ohlin 
type supply-side to the HME model so that market access differences will affect 
wages as well as net exports. Exploring how this model performs in a higher-
dimensional setting is a task for future research. In a higher-dimensional setting, the 
technical challenge increases with the number of unknowns, e.g. two factor prices for 
each country rather than one. 
11 With two regions, we obtain bifurcations and the well-known “Tomahawk 
diagram” (see e.g. Fujita et al. 1999, 68). With 90 regions, “star wars” would be a 
possibility! 
12 We cannot exclude “triangular” trade so that there is a trade imbalance bilaterally, 
but aggregate trade always has to be balanced. 
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- Given that trade is balanced, domestic consumption and production 
of the differentiated goods must be equal. For this reason, the num-
ber of firms will be proportional to country size.  
- Wage levels will however differ and for this reason the value of 
production and consumption will also differ across countries. 
- Welfare is equal to the nominal wage divided by the price level; i.e. 
for region i per capita welfare will be Xi=wi/Pi. Regions with a fa-
vourable location close to markets will have lower price levels. In 
general, we will see from the results that effects via the price levels 
are larger than the nominal wage changes. 
 
In Appendix A, we also include the HME model as a parallel case 
which we use as a yardstick for comparison and a useful contrast that 
sheds light on the results. In the following, we shall also compare the 
two models since it usefully sheds light on how net export effects and 
wage effects may differ. Given that net export effects play a key role in 
most NEG models, this exercise has broader relevance. 
Does the wage gap model live up to the requirement of low-di-
mensional solvability and high-dimensional computability?  Based on 
our experience, the answer is generally yes with respect to comput-
ability. The model has a solution although we cannot guarantee that it 
has always a positive and real solution for all possible parameter val-
ues. In the simulations undertaken, the model was well-behaved with 
positive solutions. Hence the model seems well-behaved in terms of 
computability. Solvability for low dimensions is trickier: Although an 
explicit analytical can be found for the case of two regions and with 
the elasticity of substitution ε=2 (see end of Appendix A), this solution 
is not very user-friendly and one has to use numerical methods to 
check its properties.  
As a first illustration, we may use this analytical solution for 
two regions in order to shed some light on the properties of the wage 
gap model. In Diagram two, we assume that region 1 is twice as large 
as region 2; i.e. the labour endowment ratio L=L1/L2=2. Diagram 2 
shows the wage ratio w1/w2 when trade costs are varied. In this low-
dimension case, there is only one type of trade costs, t12=t21=t. 
 
Diagram 2: Trade liberalisation and the wage ratio
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Here trade costs vary from zero (t=1) and 300% (t=4). At high levels 
of trade costs, we can (using the expression for w in Appendix A) find 
that the wage ratio converges to L1/3; in this case approximately 1.26. 
When trade costs are lowered, the wage gap is gradually eliminated. 
Some implications of this are:   
 
- In the two-region case, reduction in trade costs reduces the wage 
difference between large and small countries/regions. There is a 
monotonous relationship and not an “inverse U” relationship as in 
some NEG models. Hence this is a NEG model without bifurca-
tions.  
- For a given size distribution of regions, there is an upper bound on 
the nominal wage inequality when t increases; in the case with two 
regions and ε=2 it is equal to L1/3. Observe however that since the 
limit value is a function of L, there is no upper limit on the wage 
ratio when L increases. 
- The HME model has the paradoxical property that while 
agglomeration is created by differences in market access, the effect 
becomes stronger when these differences are reduced. In this sense 
the wage gap model is more plausible: Trade liberalization reduces 
the wage gap. Furthermore, the difference between price indexes 
must also be reduced when differences in market access disappear, 
so liberalization will lead to converging welfare levels. Hence 
small countries must gain more from trade liberalization, while in 
the HME model the welfare gain from liberalization is proportional 
across countries.  
- Compared to the HME model, the wage gap model is well-behaved 
with positive solutions for a larger range of parameter values. Al-
though negative and complex roots can also be observed, the 
problem is marginal compared to the HME model.  
 
According to this first check, it therefore appears that the wage gap 
model is more plausible then the HME model, by being better-behaved 
and by eliminating the paradoxical outcomes of the HME model at low 
levels of trade costs.   
In order to examine further some properties that are relevant for 
spatial modeling, we next compare the two models using a “Hotelling” 
world where regions of equal size are dispersed evenly along a line. If 
trade costs are increasing exponentially with distance in this setting; 
i.e. tij=t|i-j| where t>1 is the trade cost between adjacent regions, and i 
and j denote the positions along the line, i,j=1,..,N, the HME model has 
a simple analytical solutions for an arbitrary number of regions (see 
Melchior 1997, Chapter 3). With no migration, demand from the pe-
ripheries (ends of the line) represents the centrifugal force, and the 
manufacturing clusters are located in the regions next to the periphery. 
Diagram 3 illustrates such a HME model, using ε=5 and t=1.5. In Dia-
gram 4, we illustrate the wage gap model for the same set-up, using 
numerical simulation. 
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Diagram 3: 7-region HME model
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Diagram 4: 7-region wage gap model
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The HME model (Diagram 3), produces a duocentric or bipolar pat-
tern of manufacturing agglomeration, where regions 2 and 6 have 
higher levels of “manufacturing” production, and the peripheral re-
gions 1 and 7 lower. The central regions 3-5 have average levels of 
production (=1/N), but they have a better geographical location and 
therefore the welfare levels of regions 2 through 6 are equal. In this 
model, reduction of trade costs leaves production in the central regions 
unaffected but increases the gap between regions 2,6 and 1,7. For suf-
ficiently low trade costs, the peripheral regions 1,7 will be deindustri-
alised.13  
Now consider the wage gap model to the right, in Diagram 4. It 
produces a smooth monocentric core-periphery pattern without distinct 
agglomerations. Nominal wages (the curve in the middle) are slightly 
higher in the central regions, but price levels are also lower so the wel-
fare (real wage) gaps are even higher. The “duocentric” pattern is how-
ever visible in the lowest curve for domestic sales: Due to lower wages 
in the peripheral regions, and lower price levels in the central regions, 
regions 2 and 6 now export less and become more closed, with a higher 
share of production sold domestically. This is diametrically opposite to 
the HME model where the 2,6 regions are “big traders”. 
In the two models, the welfare results are similar in the sense 
that they are both monocentric. This may indicate that welfare predic-
tions may be considered as more robust and less dependent on model-
ing assumptions than predictions about agglomeration or wage 
changes. To some extent, we may be more agnostic about whether the 
main impact is on the net trade pattern or income as long as the welfare 
effects are more comparable.  
For empirical analysis, a useful property of the wage gap model 
is that it offers predictions about nominal variables: nominal wage ef-
fects may differ from welfare results and frequently, price level effects 
are more important than nominal changes and appropriate handling of 
                                                 
13 When tε-1=2 the peripheral regions will have zero production. For example, with 
ε=5 the peripheries will be de-industrialised for t lower than 1.19.  
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the real/nominal distinction may be quite important. Nominal changes 
are not “nuisance” that should be cleaned away to approach the real 
things; they may be important for understanding change.  
Using simulations with the HME model, Melchior (2000) found 
that the relative magnitude of “spatial” and “non-spatial” trade costs 
determined whether a duocentric or (in a two-dimensional model) 
“manufacturing belt” outcome occurred, or a more centralized out-
come. With a higher level of non-spatial trade costs, a centralized pat-
tern may be the outcome even in the HME model. In order to illustrate 
this, we add a non-spatial trade cost that applies to sales to all other 
regions, together with the spatial or transport-cost type of trade costs. 
We then examine what happens when either type of trade costs is 
changed. Diagrams 5 and 6 show the outcomes in the HME model (the 
number of firms) and the wage gap model (the nominal wage), respec-
tively.14  
 
Diagram 5: Non-spatial trade costs in the 
HME model: Levels of production
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Diagram 6: The impact of non-spatial 
trade costs in the wage gap model: 
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In both cases, the introduction of non-spatial trade costs creates a 
more even distribution. In the HME model, there is a radical change 
from the duocentric to a monocentric pattern of agglomeration, and the 
sharp inequality between the two regions at each end of the line and 
the rest has disappeared. In the wage gap model, the wage distribution 
is still monocentric but with less inequality than before. There is a sig-
nificant increase in the nominal wages of the peripheral regions, and 
reduced nominal wages in the central regions. Changes in welfare are 
similar but more modest.  
If we reverse the sequence in both models, moving from “with” 
to “without” in the diagrams, it is evident that, a reduction in non-spa-
tial trade costs will create more regional inequality. In the HME 
model, liberalization will also promote a movement from a “mono-
                                                 
14 In both diagrams we use ε=5, spatial trade costs that are 1/6*distance (i.e. =100% 
between the peripheral regions which have distance 6), and in the “high” curve in the 
graph non-spatial trade costs=0.2 for sales in all regions except own region. Hence 
spatial trade costs now increase linearly with distance. Total trade costs with other 
regions are then 1+1/6*distance+0.2. In Diagram 6 non-spatial trade costs=0 for the 
“low” curve. With these value, however, regions 1 and 7 obtain negative production 
in the HME model, so in Diagram 5 we use non-spatial costs at 0.05  for the “low” 
curve.  
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centric” pattern of agglomeration to the duocentric or bipolar pattern 
that obtains in the HME model without non-spatial trade costs.15  
Now turn to the reduction of spatial trade costs: We start from 
the situation described by the “with” curve in Diagrams 5 and 6, and 
reduce the spatial trade costs only.16 Diagrams 7 and 8 show the out-
come, for the HME and the wage gap models respectively: 
 
Diagram 7: Spatial trade liberalisation in the 
HME model. Production levels.
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Diagram 8: Spatial trade liberalisation in the 
wage gap model: Nominal wage levels
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Contrary to the case with non-spatial liberalization where the outcome 
was similar, the impact of liberalization in the two models is now dia-
metrically opposite: In the HME model, spatial trade liberalization 
leads to a stronger core-periphery pattern, while in the wage gap 
model the opposite is the case. Spatial liberalization weakens the cen-
trifugal force of the model; peripheries can now be served from the 
central areas and there is no wage adjustment stopping the relocation 
of production toward the centre. But in the wage gap model, spatial 
trade liberalization is to the advantage of the peripheral regions. Later, 
we shall see that this also applies in the simulations with our stylized 
European map. 
These results show that the modeling approach may be crucial 
for some of the results in spatial models. In our simulations, we should 
therefore be aware about the sensitivity of results to the modeling as-
sumptions, and in particular the model choice. In general, we consider 
the results from the wage gap model as more intuitive since the model 
is technically more well-behaved, and is does not have the counterin-
tuitive properties related to the impact of trade liberalization.  Never-
theless, we cannot exclude the possibility that “duocentric” outcomes 
and the net export effects of the HME model, with stronger relocation 
effects, are empirically relevant. We shall therefore carry out simula-
tions also with the HME model, and check whether results differ be-
tween the two modeling approaches. 
                                                 
15 Observe that we still have no country borders, so we only have regions but no 
countries. In the simulations to be undertaken, we also let regions form countries, and 
in that context the impact of spatial liberalization may be modified. 
16 We reduce the scaling parameter for spatial trade costs from 1/6 to 0.05.  
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In the simulations, we use different levels of trade costs in or-
der to check the sensitivity of results with respect to the levels of trade 
costs. There is generally no “U-shape” in our model so that agglom-
eration is stronger at intermediate levels of trade costs; it is neverthe-
less possible that integration effects depend on the level of trade costs. 
A reason for this is that trade liberalization is generally not neutral 
with respect to the ratio between spatial and non-spatial trade costs. 
An illustration is the following: Assume that trade costs to a neighbour 
region a are ta1=1+0.2+0.2=1.4; where the two terms equal to 0.2 rep-
resent spatial and non-spatial trade costs, respectively. To a region b 
twice as far away, we assume that trade costs are tb1=1+0.4+0.2=1.6, 
since distance costs are doubled. Now cut both types of trade costs by 
half, so that new trade costs are ta2=1.2 and tb2=1.3. We see that 
ta1/tb1<ta2/tb2. A proportional reduction in all trade costs thus tends to 
make spatial trade costs relatively less important, and this might affect 
the model outcome.  
In Table B1, Appendix B, we show the parameter values used 
in the various simulations. We call these “High”, “Main” and “Low” 
and we will generally report only results from the “Main” alternative 
with an intermediate level of trade costs. Table B2 shows the average 
level of trade costs for trade between regions in different countries in 
one of the scenarios (the WEST scenario). We see that the average 
level of trade cost is around 25% in the “Low” scenario, around 50% 
in the “Main scenario” and around 200% in the “High” scenario. In 
spite of the suggestion by Anderson and van Wijnkoop (2003) that 
total trade costs broadly defined, including distribution costs, could be 
as high as 170%, we consider the level in our “High” scenario as 
somewhat exaggerated. However, that is the level required if all re-
gions are to have positive production in all scenarios in the HME 
model. We include this in order to be able to run simulations with the 
HME model in parallel to the wage gap model. We wish to include 
HME simulations in order to check whether the regional patterns of 
sector agglomeration effects are similar to outcome in the wage gap 
model.   
In the analysis, our main concern is about changes from one 
scenario to another. Hence we are interested in e.g. how the change 
from WEST to WIDER affects income and welfare. The main purpose 
is not to explain the current income distribution in Europe, but to ex-
amine how this is affected by changes in market access.  Hence we do 
not try to calibrate the model to some actual distribution, but choose a 
configuration of parameter values that appears plausible and techni-
cally feasible, and then examine changes from there. Using the wage 
gap model, we obtain an income distribution similar to diagram 4, with 
modestly higher wages and welfare in the central regions of the rec-
tangular grid. Diagram 9 shows welfare levels in the “base case” be-
fore any regional blocs are formed, with intermediate level of trade 
costs.  
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We observe a core-periphery pattern with lower welfare particularly in 
regions far to the west and east. Observe also the high welfare level in 
E1, due to the market access advantage of larger country size. Given 
that this situation without integration might represent the post-war 
situation in the 1940s and 1950s, it is evident that there was 
communism in the Soviet Union. In the model used here, results are 
driven by market forces and it is therefore inadequate to explain wel-
fare changes during the Soviet period. For the Soviet/ COMECON 
period, the results may therefore be of limited relevance. For Western 
Europe (the four countries W1-W4), however, the pattern with periph-
eries in the west and higher incomes in W3+W4 is quite plausible in 
the light of empirical research (see e.g. Combes and Overman 2004 or 
Dall’erba 2005), although the true European map is certainly richer 
than ours.  
From this starting point, we examine how regional distribution 
is affected in the 10 scenarios. In tables B3-B5 in Appendix B, we 
show correlation coefficients between results using different levels of 
trade costs. We also show how results with the HME model, available 
for a high level of trade costs, are correlated with the results using the 
wage gap model. These tables provide another check of the robustness 
of results. The general conclusions are:  
 
- The results are robust with respect to the level of trade costs since 
similar results are obtained with low, intermediate and high trade 
costs. In general, the absolute values of the correlation coefficients 
are above 0.9 in most cases.17 For example, for the WIDER sce-
nario, welfare results in the wage gap model are correlated with a 
correlation coefficient between 0.94 and 0.99 (Table B3), and 
                                                 
17 Observe that the sign depends on which variable is involved; welfare and wages 
are positively correlated in the wage gap model, and the same applies to domestic 
sales and the price index; but these two pairs of variables are negatively correlated.  
 23
changes in welfare from scenario WEST to WIDER are correlated 
with coefficients at 0.95-0.99 (Table B4).  
- For the HME model, domestic sales (i.e. in own region) is an 
appropriate indicator also for per capita welfare (see Appendix A). 
Hence we observe from Table B3 that welfare in the HME model 
with WIDER is highly correlated with welfare in the wage gap 
model (absolute value of correlation coefficient=0.97), and this 
also applies to the welfare change (0.98, see Table B4).  
- For production levels in the HME model, however, correlations 
with results from the wage gap model are still significant but in 
most cases lower. For example, with high trade costs, the number 
of firms under WIDER using the HME model, and the wages ob-
tained using the wage model, are positively correlated with a coef-
ficient of 0.56. Hence the spatial pattern of change is partly differ-
ent in the two models.  
 
In Table B5, we show such correlations for more scenarios and they 
confirm that production or net trade effects in the HME model is often 
less correlated with all other results.  In some cases, results from the 
HME and wage gap models are even opposite. These are shown by 
shaded cells in Table B5. These cases are nevertheless exceptions and 
in the majority of cases, the direction of the effects is similar in the 
two models. Base on the comparison, we conclude:   
 
- The HME model and the wage gap model behave qualitatively 
similarly for scenarios with European regional integration; in the 
sense that welfare results, and production vs. wages, are positively 
correlated. 
- For the SPATIAL scenario where distance-related trade costs are 
reduced, the two models give opposite predictions, as in Diagrams 
7-8.  
- For EASTOPEN, the HME model suggests that unilateral 
liberalization gives a welfare loss while the opposite is the case for 
the wage gap model. This illustrates that the wage gap model is 
more “trade-friendly” than the HME model, where unilateral pro-
tectionism may sometimes improve welfare.  
 
Hence in some cases, the results depend on the type of model used. It 
is ultimately an empirical issue what is true, although – as argued – we 
have more faith in the wage gap model as an average effect across 
sectors for the whole economy.  
 This concludes our methodological examination of the model. 
The challenge for numerical modeling is to show that results are not 
only stories with limited generality based on some arbitrary parameter 
values. We believe to have shown that the results that are presented in 
the following are more than this. They hold for a wide range of pa-
rameter values, and we have illuminated some of the model mecha-
nisms that create the results.  
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4. Model simulation results 
 
The numerical modeling results are intended as a point of departure for 
empirical examination of the issues. Therefore, a wide variety of sce-
narios and results are included. We will here only briefly sum up some 
main results. In Appendix C, Tables C1-C18 and the corresponding 
Diagrams C1-C18 we report results from scenarios 2-10. We only re-
port results for the wage gap model with an intermediate level of trade 
costs.18 For each scenario, the tables include nominal wage levels and 
welfare levels, and changes in these from some other scenario (speci-
fied in the tables, often the WEST scenario). For each table, there is a 
corresponding grey-scale map graph which shows changes for each 
region, with some key words in the header. We generally do not repeat 
much detail in the main text so the readers are invited to use these 
graphs in Appendix C as an intuitive visualization of the results.  
 The results encompass standard results about regional integra-
tion from the new trade theory (see e.g. Baldwin and Venables 1995 
for an overview) where participating countries gain and outsiders may 
sometimes lose. As shown in this literature, an “agglomeration 
shadow” may fall on non-participants close to the trade bloc. In stan-
dard HME or NEG models, this effect is driven by net export effects 
and so-called “production-shifting”. In the wage gap model, there is no 
such production-shifting and the agglomeration shadow takes the form 
of lower nominal and real wages. Another new feature in our analysis 
is that positive and negative effects vary across regions inside coun-
tries. 
 The results clearly indicate that there is no unambiguous 
conclusion about how international integration affects domestic re-
gions. All our scenarios represent international integration, but the im-
pact on regions is different in each case. By the same reasoning, we 
cannot expect any unambiguous conclusion about regional inequality: 
International integration may lead to convergence in some cases, and 
divergence in others. Our analysis has therefore provided the “non-
answer” we were searching for: There is no unambiguous rule, and 
searching for a universal answer is like barking under the wrong tree.  
 Our simulations include four regional integration scenarios; 
WEST, WIDER, EAST-WEST and EAST. In all the four cases, all the 
participating regions unambiguously gain in terms of welfare. Hence 
also in the case of widening integration from 4 to 6 and 7, the old 
members improve real wages. The gains are to some extent unevenly 
distributed: 
 
- In WEST, there is a larger gain for regions that are close to the 
centre of the WEST area, around the point where the four countries 
all border to each other. 
- In WIDER, the gain is larger in the new member states. For these, 
the gain is larger in the western regions, but for the old members 
                                                 
18 Results from other scenarios used in the robustness checks in Tables B3-B5 can be 
provided upon request. 
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W1-W4, the opposite is the case. Hence EAST-WEST is better for 
W3 and W4 than for W1 and W2, and better for eastern regions in 
these countries. EAST-WEST moves the centre of gravity in the 
regional integration area to the east.  
- EAST-WEST gives a strong welfare gain for the new participant 
(E2) and modest positive effects for all the old participants, with a 
slightly better outcome for regions closer to the new participant. 
According to this, present participants of European integration 
have no reason to fear further enlargement. 
- With Eastern integration (EAST),19  the larger country E1 
generally gains less than the other two since without integration, it 
already benefits from its large country advantage. In the wage gap 
model, integration is better for the small countries by creating wage 
convergence.  
 
In some, but not all cases, the welfare gain from integration is accom-
panied by a nominal wage increase as well. This is however not al-
ways the case, as seen in Appendix C.   
 In a non-spatial model of regional integration, the “agglomera-
tion shadow” or negative impact on outsiders apply to all countries 
outside. In our case, the integration shadow is clearly visible but it is 
stronger in outside regions close to the trade bloc that is formed. In the 
WEST scenario, the negative impact on wages as well as welfare is 
larger for Central/ Eastern European regions close to the WEST bloc, 
and weaker for remote regions.  There is however a negative impact 
for all outside regions. This applies also to the impact of WIDER and 
EAST-WEST on the outsiders. 
 The results on European regional integration show that east-
ward widening of the trade bloc gradually moves the “centre of grav-
ity” eastward, while former members also gain from integration. Since 
the centre of gravity then gets closer and closer to the centre of the 
rectangular grid, the benefits of integration will be strongly correlated 
with any measure of “market potential”. This strengthens the case for 
market potential approaches in the study of European integration (see 
e.g. Brülhart et al. 2004). Such a correlation between market potential 
and the impact of integration is however not present in all scenarios. 
For the “iron curtain” (IRON) scenario, WTO and especially 
SPATIAL (reduced distance costs) there may actually be a negative 
correlation, at least with simple market potential measure of the types 
introduced by Harris (1954):  
 
- While the “iron curtain” is bad for welfare all over Europe, it is 
particularly adverse for regions close to the curtain itself; in west-
ern regions in Central Europe, or eastern regions in WEST.  
- The WTO scenario is especially positive for countries and regions 
that do not participate in regional trade blocs. When “multilateral 
trade liberalization” (WTO) is undertaken in the presence of 
                                                 
19 Observe that Eastern integration departs from a situation with WEST, so it is not 
the only trade bloc, like in the other three cases of regional integration. 
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WEST, it is particularly positive for regions outside but close to 
WEST. But also members of the regional bloc gain from such lib-
eralization. WTO liberalization erodes the European trade prefer-
ences and thereby dampens trade policy discrimination. 
- Reductions in spatial trade costs have a powerful equalising effect 
by being more positive for peripheral regions along the border of 
the rectangular space, in particular the regions far to the west and 
to the east. Observe that in this case the HME model and the wage 
gap model gives different predictions, and our simulation results 
are along the lines with the pattern shown in Diagram 8. 
 
Hence the spatial impact of different types of integration varies, and 
some trade reforms will lead to more income growth in regions with a 
lower market potential in the sense of Harris (1954).  
 Finally, observe that if capital cities are “hubs” so that business 
has to take place via the capital (scenario CAPITAL), it strongly 
boosts the real wage level in capital regions.20 In our Russia-like coun-
try E1, the hub effect is particularly severe for regions to the far east. 
For these regions, even some of their trade with neighbour regions has 
to pass through the capital, and this creates a sharp increase in trade 
costs. The hub effect is also more severe and negative for some re-
gions in north-west E2 and north-west Eurasian E3: These regions can 
no longer exploit their geographical proximity to Europe but have to 
ship some of their goods indirectly via capitals. On the other hand, 
north-west E3 and south-east E3 are in fact relatively better off since 
the hub effect implies a rebalancing of regions within the two coun-
tries, by eliminating some of the geographical relative disadvantages. 
Hub-and-spoke effect inside countries tend to eliminate the east-west 
and north-south differences in the impact of various policies, since all 
peripheries in the country become peripheral, wherever they are lo-
cated. If the distance to the capital is larger, as for eastern E3 in our 
map, the impact is worse. 
 Central European countries C1-C2 are strongly affected in a 
number of different scenarios, be it as part of a European integration 
scheme, or being in the shadow outside trade blocs to the west or to 
the east, or benefiting from “preference erosion” due to WTO liberali-
zation, or being trapped closed to the iron curtain. Hence not only ar-
mies have rolled over Central Europe; our results suggest that the 
forces of economic geography are also strong compared to the more 
“quiet corners” to the west and to the east.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The main purpose of this paper has been to provide an extended theo-
retical underpinning for the empirical study of European integration 
                                                 
20 In Tables C17-18, we show the case when this capital hub effect occurs in a setting 
departing from the WEST scenario. We have also tried with other scenarios, and the 
impact is similar so we only report this case. The presence of hub effects may modify 
the analysis of changes between different scenarios, but we do not address this in 
order to avoid too much detail.   
 27
and regional income gaps in Europe. Carrying out such empirical work 
is an extensive task that has been left for future research. The model 
simulations show a number of different scenarios and a task for em-
pirical analysis is to determine the relevance of each scenario. During 
the last decades, different trade reforms have occurred simultaneously 
(e.g. EU integration, East-West trade agreements, WTO or GATT lib-
eralization, dissolution of the Soviet Union, fall of the iron curtain 
etc.). In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, a challenge is the 
phenomenon of “transition” which may imply that there is an extended 
period of institutional change from the former planning system to the 
market economy. Although the most dramatic change probably had 
occurred by the mid-1990s, some effects of this change may be long-
lasting and possibly overshadow other events. 
Our analysis captures some mechanisms but certainly not all, 
and the development of European regions is certainly affected by other 
aspects that are not addressed by the model. Input-output effects con-
stitute a core feature in regional CGE (computable general equilib-
rium) models that have been constructed for some European countries 
(see e.g.  Bröcker and Schneider 2002).21 While our model has nine 
countries, it leaves out the rest of the world and this is surely a short-
coming. For example, the industrial change of Germany is surely af-
fected by competition from Asia, which is left out in our framework. 
Hence the results should be interpreted with these reservations in 
mind.  
In spite of these limitations, the results provide a rich set of hy-
potheses about the spatial and regional impact of integration in 
Europe, which will hopefully be of use in further research in the field. 
The scenarios shed light on different policy events and give predic-
tions about nominal as well as real income changes and their spatial 
variation. In Melchior (2008b) we use the results derived here as a 
platform for empirical analysis of European regions during 1995-2005. 
 
 
                                                 
21 With more factors of production, new effects may arise; for example, in 
Haaparanta (1998) trade-induced factor market competition can drive up factor prices 
and even cause a welfare loss in some cases. 
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Appendix A: The modelling framework 
 
We present the model here in a form which encompasses both models 
used in the numerical simulations; the wage gap model (which is the 
main approach) and the home market effect (HME) model (which is 
used for comparison and as a supplement to shed light on trade ef-
fects). 
 There are N regions. Each region, indexed i or j, has a single 
factor of production; labour, with endowment Li22 and wage wi. The 
total income of the economy is therefore Yi=wiLi. In order to keep no-
tation simple, we use only one set of subscripts (not for regions and 
countries separately).  
Following a standard Dixit-Stiglitz approach, labour can be 
used in the production of individual varieties of manufactured goods 
under increasing returns to scale. For an individual variety xi produced 
in region i, there is, measured in labour units, a fixed production cost f, 
constant marginal costs c and trade costs tij for sales in market j.23 For 
a good produced in region i and sold in market j, the cost in value 
terms is equal to wi (f+ctijxij).  
Trade costs are expressed as a mark-up on marginal costs so 
tij≥1, e.g. a trade cost of 10% implies tij=1.1. For the purpose of the 
analysis here, we also allow non-zero trade costs in the home market, 
so tii may be larger than 1.24 For example, some Russian regions are 
huge with low population density, and it would be implausible to as-
sume that internal trade costs are zero. While zero domestic trade costs 
are normally assumed in theoretical applications, it is technically no 
problem to have non-zero trade costs. We assume that tij>tjj; i.e. inter-
regional trade may be thought to include the intra-regional cost plus 
some additional inter-regional cost. This assumption is plausible but 
also needed for the model to be well behaved. 
 We assume standard CES (constant elasticity of substitution) 
demand functions, so demand for a variety from region i in market j is 
equal to xij = pij-εPjε-1Dj where pij is the price of a variety from region i 
in market j, ε is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (with the 
standard assumption ε>1), Pj is the CES price index in region j, and Dj 
is the total value of manufactured goods sold in market j (we revert to 
how this is determined). With monopolistic competition, firms maxi-
mise profits πi=-fwi+ Σj (pij-wictij)xij, and we obtain the standard pric-
ing condition pij=[ε/(ε-1)] wi ctij. Furthermore, free entry and exit im-
ply that total profits have to equal sunk costs f, and as a consequence 
the total value of sales for a firm in region i will be εfwi.  
                                                 
22 For the purpose of empirical analysis, it may sometimes be useful to think of this 
as “efficiency units” rather than population, in order to adjust for different 
productivities in the economy. 
23 We consider it simpler in terms of notation to express trade costs as a mark-up on 
marginal costs rather than the usual iceberg formulation where goods melt away in 
transport. The results are similar. 
24 In the results presented in the text, we have assumed zero trade costs within each 
region. Simulations including such trade costs, for example as a function of land area 
or population density, were however also tried and we therefore express the model in 
a form which allows this possibility. 
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 Now write vij = xijpij for the value of sales of an individual firm 
from region i in some market j. Dividing vij by vjj, we can express the 
sales vij in some market j as a function of the home market sales vjj of 
firms in that market: Using the demand functions and the pricing con-
dition, we obtain vij = vjj * (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε. Using this, the total sales 
of a firm in region i, ∑j vij=εfwi, can be written as  
 
∑j vjj (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε= εfwi  
 
or, moving the common term wi to the right hand side,  
 
∑j vjj wjε-1 (tij/tjj)1-ε= εf*wiε.  
 
For the N regions, we have N equations with 2N unknowns (vii, wi). In 
order to express this in matrix form, we define 
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T expresses the relative trade costs in all markets, relative to domestic 
supply. Using this, the equation system above can be written as 
 
(1)  TN×N × Diag (wiε-1) N×N × [vii] N×1 = εf × [wiε]N×1 
 
where Diag (wiε-1) N×N is the diagonal matrix with wiε-1 as diagonal 
elements, [vii] N×1 is a vector with vii (i.e. the home market sales of 
firms in each region) as elements, and [wiε]N×1 is a vector with wiε as 
diagonal elements. 
 The sales of all firms in market j must add up to Dj; i.e.  
∑i nivij=Dj. ni is the number of manufacturing firms in region i, and 
since there is no firm heterogeneity, and no sunk exports costs, all 
firms will sell a (large or small) positive amount in any market. Ex-
pressing all vij’s in terms of home market sales as above, we can put wi 
and vii on the right hand side and obtain the system of N equations  
 
(2)  TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [ni] N×1  
= Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Di]N×1 
 
Combining (1) and (2) we have 2N equations with 3N unknowns (ni, vii 
and wi). By adding more structure we can reduce the number of un-
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knowns to 2N and solve the system. The wage gap model and the 
HME model represent two alternative approaches: 
In the wage gap model, we assume that manufacturing is the 
only sector in the economy. Then the whole income is spent on manu-
factured goods so we have Di=wiLi. Given that firm size is determined 
(see above) and assuming full employment, the number of manufac-
turing firms must be ni= wiLi/(εfwi)= Li/(εf). Thereby eliminating the 
unknowns ni, we obtain a system with 2N unknowns that may be 
solved. Equation (2) then simplifies to:  
 
(2a)  TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Li] N×1  
= εf × Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi2-ε) N×N × [Li]N×1 
 
This is however a non-linear system where no explicit analytical solu-
tion can be found.25 We therefore use numerical simulation in order to 
determine the outcome. As noted, we call this the wage gap model 
since differences in market access show up in different wages. For ex-
ample, large regions will, ceteris paribus, have higher wages, a shown 
already by Krugman (1980).  
 In the numerical simulations, it requires more time and is com-
putationally less efficient to run the whole system with 2N equations; it 
is better to express [vii] N×1 as a function of the wage and insert in (2a). 
We then simulate (2a) with the N wage levels as the only unknown. 
Given that no explicit matrix solution is available, an approximate so-
lution has to be found by numerical iteration. In the simulations, we 
minimize the function 
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where LHS and RHS refers to the left hand side and right hand side, 
respectively, of each of the 90 equations. In order to have the exact 
solution this sum would have to become zero but that is generally not 
possible. Hence we have to decide some upper threshold for this sum 
of squared deviations and find an approximation to the solution. In all 
then simulations presented, the values of Fi was below one, and below 
0.5 in the most important scenarios. The accuracy depends on com-
puter time and the number of iterations. For the scenarios simulated 
here and with the ranges of parameter values used, we obtained strictly 
positive solutions in all cases. The results were also checked, e.g. by 
computing trade flows and checking adding-up properties and this in-
dicated a high degree of accuracy. 
Observe also that the nominal level of wages, prices and sales 
is not determined and may be scaled up or down. We therefore have to 
                                                 
25 We did actually solve it for the case with two countries and ε=2, but in the general 
case an explicit solution is hard to find. Note also that in (2a) we cannot “abbreviate” 
the similar terms on the left and right hand sides, since in general, for three matrices 
A, B and C, AC=BC does not necessarily imply that A=B. 
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normalise all results since the numerical results may end up at different 
levels. Since productivity is unchanged throughout the “events” we 
simulate, we normalise the average wage to equal one. 
A second option, frequently used in the literature and referred 
to as the HME model, is to add a “numeraire sector” in which labour 
produces a homogeneous good with constant returns to scale. Assum-
ing that one unit of labour produces one unit of output of the homoge-
neous good and that such goods are traded at zero trade costs, wages 
per efficiency unit in the regions must be equalised as long as all re-
gions produce the homogeneous good. Using the homogeneous good 
as numeraire, wages everywhere must then equal one; wi=1 for all i. 
The version here is a slightly modified and multilateralised version of 
the “home market effect model” of Krugman (1980). We must also 
address how consumption is divided between the two types of goods; 
using a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier function with consumption share α 
for manufacturing, total demand for manufacturing becomes Dj= αLj 
(since total income is now Lj). In the multilateral version, equation (1) 
simplifies to TN×N × [vii] N×1 = εf × [1]N×1 (i.e. with a unit column on 
the right hand side). The solution for [vii]NxN can then be found. Equa-
tion (2) becomes 
 
(2b)  TN×N’× [ni] N×1 = α ×Diag (vii-1) N×N × [Li]N×1 
 
Using the solutions for vii, we can then also solve for the number of 
firms, and it can be shown that, ceteris paribus, large countries will 
have a higher than proportionate share of manufacturing. 
 In the wage gap model, the advantage of better market access is 
realised in the form of a higher nominal wage per efficiency unit, 
whereas in the home market effect model, the advantage appears in the 
form of manufacturing agglomeration. Corresponding to these two 
outcomes, the trade patterns also differ: In the wage gap model, exter-
nal trade in manufactured goods has to be balanced and all trade is 
intra-industry trade. In the home market effect model, trade in manu-
factured goods may be unbalanced, but has to be matched by a com-
pensating trade imbalance for homogeneous goods.26  
 In the HME model, we can use the CES price index for manu-
factured goods as a measure of welfare per capita. It is analytically 
convenient to use Ri=Pi1-ε as an indicator of welfare (which can be 
done since it is monotonically related to Pi). We can then express the 
vector [Ri]N×1 in matrix form as 
 
(3b) [ ] ( )[ ] [ ]nTtDiagR iiii NNNN NN 111 '1 1 1 ××−× ×××⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −= − −×εεε ε  
                                                 
26 Whereas bilateral trade flows for manufactured goods are determined in this 
model, only the aggregate trade balance for homogeneous goods is determined, not 
the bilateral flows. Hence different patterns of bilateral trade in homogeneous goods 
are possible, and additional assumptions are needed to pin down the exact pattern. 
For the purpose of evaluating e.g. income or welfare, this is however not a problem 
or shortcoming. 
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From (2b) we can find the solution for [ni] and substitute into (3b). 
The components T’×(T’)-1 then cancel out and we obtain the expres-
sion  
 
(3c) 
[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]LvDiagtDiag iiiiii NNNNNNR 111 11 11 ×××−× ×××⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −×= −− −εεεα ε  
 
Since the inverse of a diagonal matrix is a diagonal matrix with inverse 
diagonal elements, we can also write   
 
(3d) 
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We observe that for region i, welfare is positively related to home 
market size Li, and inversely related to the home market sales of firms 
(vii) as well as domestic trade costs (tii).27 The intuition is that  
 
- in economically large regions that  have a higher share of produc-
tion, consumers buy a larger fraction of goods from domestic pro-
ducers and thereby pay less trade costs (since tij>tjj)  
- domestic trade costs increase prices and reduce welfare 
- if firms sell a large share of production domestically, it reflects that 
inter-regional trade costs are high and that reduces welfare. 
 
In this model, the world total number of firms is constant (=∑iLi/(εf)) 
so there is no welfare effect of changes in the number of varieties. 
 In the wage gap model, welfare depends on nominal wages as 
well as the price level. Welfare can then be measured directly by the 
CES quantity aggregator or utility function Xi=[∑i xi1-ε]1/(1-ε). Since 
total consumption equals total income; i.e. for region i we have 
XiPi=wiLi, we simply obtain that per capita welfare is equal to 
 
(4) 
P
w
L
X
i
i
i
i =  
 
Using numerical solutions for wi, we can derive Pi and use this expres-
sion to evaluate welfare. 
 The wage gap model can actually be solved analytically in the 
case of two regions, symmetrical trade costs t12=t21=t and ε=2. Using 
the notation L=L1/L2, z=1- ε and x=(w2/w1)2, the system has three roots 
                                                 
27 In most simulation results presented in the paper, we assume that Li=1 for all 
regions and that there are no domestic trade costs, tii=1. In that case, we can directly 
use vii as an index of welfare. 
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of which two are complex. The third root, which is used for some nu-
merical illustrations in the text, is equal to 
 
(5)   
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where  
 
zzzz ttLtLtLa 432242 46 −−−=   
 
and  
 ( ) ( )( )zzzzz tLtLtLtLtLb 22223234 2292227 ++−++=  
 
In some special cases, the square root term in (5) can become negative 
so that the root of x becomes complex. In the text, we use this equation 
to simulate how the model behaves for different parameter values 
(Diagram 2). 
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Table B1: Parameter values in model simulations 
(common values in all simulations, and specific changes in each 
scenario) 
     
Elasticity of substitution 
5 in all simulations except 
for Diagram 2 in text, 
where ε=2 since the 
solution (5) from Appendix 
A is used. 
Level of trade costs 
 High 
Inter-
mediate/ 
main 
Low 
Abbreviated name High Main Low 
Scaling of distance (equal to maximum 
of spatial trade cost) 2.5 0.5 0.25 
Other regions intra-
nationally  0.5 0.1 0.05 
In regional trade blocs 0.75 0.2 0.1 
Trade costs 
that are inde-
pendent of 
distance To/from countries out-
side trade bloc 1.0 0.3 0.15 
     
Specific adjustments in each scenario: 
SPATIAL: Distance scaling changed to 2 0.25 
WTO: Barriers to/from countries outside 
trade bloc reduced to 0.9 0.25 
EASTOPEN: E2’s trade costs increased 
to 1.5 0.5 
IRON: Non-spatial barriers between 
WEST and the rest changed to 10 10 
Not 
calcu-
lated 
Regional integration scenarios (WEST-WIDER and EAST-WEST): 
The level of trade costs applying to trade blocs applied to the relevant 
members in each case. 
CAPITAL: A separate matrix of trade costs was calculated where all 
trade with and inside the three countries to the east (E1, E2 and E3) 
had to pass through the capitals. The designated capitals were regions 
(5, 11), (2,11) and (2,14). Distances were recalculated. Trade costs 
were then calculated using the average between this and the ordinary 
distance matrix, with equal weights. 
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Table B2: Illustration of the level of trade costs used in the simulations 
Level of trade costs between regions in the “WEST” scenario, country averages (per-
centage levels) 
High level of trade costs 
Receiving country: 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 C1 C2 E1 E2 E3 Ave-rage 
W1 69 129 129 149 203 214 278 261 309 193 
W2 129 69 149 129 214 203 285 253 303 193 
W3 129 149 69 129 154 174 228 214 261 168 
W4 149 129 129 69 174 154 238 203 253 166 
C1 203 214 154 174 69 154 179 174 214 171 
C2 214 203 174 154 154 69 194 154 203 169 
E1 278 285 228 238 179 194 87 164 164 202 
E2 261 253 214 203 174 154 164 69 154 183 
E3 309 303 261 253 214 203 164 154 69 214 
Average 193 193 168 166 171 169 202 183 214  
Intermediate level of trade costs (main case) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 C1 C2 E1 E2 E3 Ave-rage 
W1 14 31 31 35 51 53 66 62 72 46 
W2 31 14 35 31 53 51 67 61 71 46 
W3 31 35 14 31 41 45 56 53 62 41 
W4 35 31 31 14 45 41 58 51 61 41 
C1 51 53 41 45 14 41 46 45 53 43 
C2 53 51 45 41 41 14 49 41 51 43 
E1 66 67 56 58 46 49 17 43 43 49 
E2 62 61 53 51 45 41 43 14 41 45 
E3 72 71 62 61 53 51 43 41 14 52 
Average 46 46 41 41 43 43 49 45 52  
Low level of trade costs 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 C1 C2 E1 E2 E3 Ave-rage 
W1 7 15 15 17 25 26 33 31 36 23 
W2 15 7 17 15 26 25 33 30 35 23 
W3 15 17 7 15 20 22 28 26 31 20 
W4 17 15 15 7 22 20 29 25 30 20 
C1 25 26 20 22 7 20 23 22 26 22 
C2 26 25 22 20 20 7 24 20 25 21 
E1 33 33 28 29 23 24 9 21 21 25 
E2 31 30 26 25 22 20 21 7 20 23 
E3 36 35 31 30 26 25 21 20 7 26 
Average 23 23 20 20 22 21 25 23 26  
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Table B3: Correlations between results from different simulations, the WIDER scenario 
Model  Wage gap model HME model 
Variable  Wage Domestic sales  (in own region) Price index Welfare Firms 
Dom. 
sales  
 Scenario High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High High 
High 1.00 0.97 0.89 -0.99 -0.93 -0.83 -0.99 -0.96 -0.93 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.71 -0.96 
Main 1.00 0.93 -0.96 -0.96 -0.88 -0.95 -0.99 -0.98 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.54 -0.87 Wage 
Low 1.00 -0.91 -0.90 -0.72 -0.92 -0.92 -0.91 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.53 -0.84 
High 1.00 0.92 0.78 1.00 0.95 0.92 -1.00 -0.95 -0.93 -0.72 0.97 
Main 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.99 -0.92 -0.97 -0.97 -0.47 0.83 Dom. Sales Low 1.00 0.77 0.92 0.94 -0.80 -0.90 -0.87 -0.32 0.67 
High 1.00 0.94 0.91 -1.00 -0.95 -0.93 -0.74 0.98 
Main 1.00 0.99 -0.95 -1.00 -0.99 -0.52 0.86 Price Index Low 1.00 -0.92 -0.99 -0.98 -0.46 0.82 
High 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.73 -0.97 
Main 1.00 0.99 0.53 -0.87 
Wage 
gap 
model 
Welfare 
Low 1.00 0.50 -0.85 
Firms High 1.00 -0.85 HME 
model Dom. High  1.00 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients, N=90. All results are statistically significant at the 1% level or better  
(P=0.0002 in one case, P<0.0001 in all other). 
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Table B4: Correlations between changes from WEST to WIDER, for  different simulations and variables 
Model  Wage gap model HME model 
Variable  Wage Dom. sales (in own region) Price index Welfare Firms 
Dom. 
sales  
 Scenario High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High High 
High 1 0.96 0.90 -0.96 -0.79 -0.94 -0.95 -0.91 -0.91 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.56 -0.97 
Main  1.00 0.95 -0.91 -0.73 -0.90 -0.90 -0.91 -0.93 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.44 -0.90 Wage 
Low   1.00 -0.93 -0.84 -0.87 -0.93 -0.97 -0.98 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.39 -0.88 
High    1.00 0.89 0.93 1.00 0.97 0.96 -0.99 -0.96 -0.95 -0.53 0.97 
Main     1.00 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.92 -0.86 -0.86 -0.90 -0.29 0.80 Dom. Sales 
Low      1.00 0.92 0.94 0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.92 -0.36 0.88 
High       1.00 0.97 0.96 -0.99 -0.96 -0.96 -0.52 0.97 
Main        1.00 1.00 -0.96 -0.98 -0.99 -0.38 0.91 Price Index 
Low         1.00 -0.95 -0.99 -1.00 -0.36 0.89 
High          1.00 0.97 0.95 0.55 -0.98 
Main           1.00 0.99 0.42 -0.92 
Wage 
gap 
model 
Welfare 
Low            1.00 0.37 -0.90 
Firms High             1.00 -0.70 HME 
model Dom. sales High              1.00 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients, N=90. All results are statistically significant at the 1% level or better (0.0001<P<0.005 in six cases, P<0.0001 
in all other). 
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Table B5: Do different models and levels of trade costs give similar results? 
High level of trade costs Intermediate 
 Wage Welfare Firms Dom. sales Wage  Welfare
Wage 1 1.00 0.36 -0.96 0.98 0.98 
Welfare  1.00 0.39 -0.97 0.98 0.98 
Firms   1.00 -0.60 0.24 0.23 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.92 -0.91 
Wage      1.00 1.00 
WEST 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.99 0.56 -0.97 0.96 0.96 
Welfare  1.00 0.55 -0.98 0.94 0.97 
Firms   1.00 -0.70 0.44 0.42 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.90 -0.92 
Wage      1.00 0.97 
WIDER 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.74 0.41 -0.73 0.98 0.38 
Welfare  1.00 0.42 -0.95 0.70 0.90 
Firms   1.00 -0.63 0.38 0.25 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.69 -0.82 
Wage      1.00 0.33 
IRON 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.95 0.23 -0.86 0.77 0.94 
Welfare  1.00 0.35 -0.95 0.89 0.97 
Firms   1.00 -0.60 0.23 0.19 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.83 -0.87 
Wage      1.00 0.94 
WTO 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.99 0.39 -0.97 0.47 0.95 
Welfare  1.00 0.33 -0.96 0.41 0.95 
Firms   1.00 -0.56 0.28 0.20 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.45 -0.90 
Wage      1.00 0.61 
EAST 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.38 -0.30 -0.01 0.03 0.05 
Welfare  1.00 -0.44 -0.41 0.43 0.37 
Firms   1.00 -0.61 -0.70 -0.70 
Dom. sales    1.00 0.37 0.42 
Wage      1.00 1.00 
SPATIAL 
Welfare On shaded cells, see main text for explanation  1.00 
Wage 1 0.99 0.61 -0.98 0.94 0.98 
Welfare  1.00 0.61 -0.98 0.91 0.97 
Firms   1.00 -0.74 0.52 0.52 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.89 -0.94 
Wage      1.00 0.97 
EAST-WEST 
Welfare      1.00 
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Table B5: Do different models and levels of trade costs give similar results? 
High level of trade costs Intermediate 
 Wage Welfare Firms Dom. sales Wage  Welfare
Wage 1 -0.96 0.92 -0.60 1.00 -0.98 
Welfare  1.00 -0.83 0.41 -0.97 0.99 
Firms   1.00 -0.80 0.89 -0.87 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.55 0.48 
Wage      1.00 -0.99 
EASTOPEN 
Welfare On shaded cells, see main text for explanation.  1.00 
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Table C1: Nominal wages – scenario WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.3 -1.1 -2.3 
5 -1.1 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.4 -0.5 -1.7 
4 -0.8 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.6 -0.3 -1.6 
3 -0.8 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.8 -3.0 
2 -1.1 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -2.0 -3.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.7 -3.7 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario “base case without integration” 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
5 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
2 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C2: Welfare (real wages) – scenario WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario Europe-4 = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 95.6 98.0 99.7 100.8 101.7 102.0 98.8 99.1 98.8 101.6 101.5 100.8 99.6 97.7 95.1 
5 97.1 99.7 101.5 102.6 103.6 103.9 100.4 100.8 100.5 103.3 103.2 102.5 101.1 99.1 96.4 
4 97.7 100.4 102.2 103.4 104.4 104.6 101.0 101.4 101.1 103.8 103.6 102.9 101.5 99.5 96.7 
3 97.7 100.4 102.2 103.4 104.4 104.6 101.0 101.4 101.1 100.8 100.2 98.9 97.8 96.2 93.7 
2 97.1 99.7 101.5 102.6 103.6 103.9 100.4 100.8 100.5 100.2 99.7 98.4 97.3 95.8 93.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 95.6 98.0 99.7 100.8 101.8 102.1 98.8 99.1 98.9 98.6 98.0 96.8 95.8 94.3 92.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario “base case with no integration” 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
5 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
4 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
3 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
2 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C3: Nominal wages – scenario “iron curtain (IRON)” 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.8 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.7 -0.1 -2.5 -1.6 -1.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.8 -1.9 
5 0.0 1.1 1.5 2.0 1.7 0.8 -1.8 -0.8 -0.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.7 -0.1 -1.3 
4 0.4 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.1 -1.6 -0.6 -0.1 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.2 -1.1 
3 0.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.1 -1.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -1.4 -2.4 
2 0.1 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.7 0.8 -1.8 -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 -1.5 -2.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.7 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.7 -0.1 -2.4 -1.5 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 -1.1 -1.7 -2.2 -3.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 -0.2 -1.1 -1.9 -1.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 
5 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.0 -1.0 -1.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
4 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
3 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.0 -1.1 -2.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 
2 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.0 -1.0 -1.9 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 -0.2 -1.1 -1.8 -1.1 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C4: Welfare (real wages) – scenario “iron curtain (IRON)” 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 85.8 87.5 88.2 88.5 88.0 86.3 87.5 89.3 90.2 93.8 94.7 94.7 94.0 92.5 90.2 
5 87.5 89.4 90.2 90.5 89.9 88.0 88.9 90.9 91.9 95.6 96.4 96.5 95.7 94.1 91.6 
4 88.1 90.2 91.0 91.3 90.6 88.7 89.3 91.4 92.5 96.1 96.9 96.9 96.1 94.5 92.0 
3 88.2 90.2 91.1 91.3 90.6 88.6 89.3 91.4 92.5 93.0 93.4 92.9 92.0 90.8 88.7 
2 87.5 89.5 90.3 90.5 89.9 88.0 89.0 91.0 92.0 92.5 92.9 92.4 91.6 90.5 88.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 85.8 87.6 88.3 88.6 88.0 86.3 87.5 89.4 90.4 90.8 91.2 90.7 89.9 88.9 87.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -9.8 -10.5 -11.5 -12.3 -13.8 -15.8 -11.3 -9.8 -8.6 -7.8 -6.9 -6.1 -5.6 -5.2 -4.9 
5 -9.6 -10.3 -11.3 -12.1 -13.7 -15.9 -11.5 -9.8 -8.5 -7.7 -6.7 -6.0 -5.5 -5.1 -4.8 
4 -9.6 -10.2 -11.2 -12.1 -13.8 -16.0 -11.7 -10.0 -8.6 -7.7 -6.7 -6.0 -5.4 -5.0 -4.8 
3 -9.5 -10.2 -11.2 -12.1 -13.8 -16.0 -11.7 -10.0 -8.6 -7.8 -6.8 -6.1 -5.8 -5.3 -5.0 
2 -9.6 -10.2 -11.2 -12.1 -13.7 -15.9 -11.5 -9.8 -8.5 -7.7 -6.7 -6.0 -5.8 -5.3 -5.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -9.8 -10.4 -11.4 -12.3 -13.8 -15.8 -11.3 -9.7 -8.5 -7.7 -6.8 -6.1 -5.9 -5.4 -5.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
 47
 
 
 
Table C5: Nominal wages – scenario WIDER 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.2 -1.1 -0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -2.6 
5 -1.5 -0.4 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 -0.8 -2.0 
4 -1.3 -0.1 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.3 -0.6 -1.8 
3 -1.3 -0.1 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 -0.6 -0.8 -1.3 -1.6 -2.3 -3.4 
2 -1.6 -0.4 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 -0.9 -1.1 -1.6 -1.8 -2.5 -3.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.2 -1.1 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 -1.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.5 -3.2 -4.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.6 1.5 1.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C6: Welfare (real wages) – scenario WIDER 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.3 98.8 100.6 101.9 103.0 103.5 103.7 103.6 103.0 101.2 101.2 100.6 99.3 97.5 94.9 
5 97.8 100.4 102.4 103.7 104.9 105.4 105.6 105.5 104.8 102.8 102.8 102.2 100.9 99.0 96.3 
4 98.4 101.1 103.1 104.5 105.7 106.2 106.4 106.3 105.6 103.3 103.2 102.6 101.3 99.3 96.6 
3 98.4 101.1 103.1 104.5 105.7 106.2 106.4 106.3 105.6 100.0 99.5 98.3 97.4 95.8 93.4 
2 97.8 100.4 102.4 103.7 104.9 105.4 105.6 105.5 104.8 99.4 99.0 97.8 96.9 95.4 93.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.2 98.8 100.6 101.9 103.0 103.5 103.7 103.6 103.0 97.8 97.3 96.2 95.4 94.0 91.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 4.9 4.5 4.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 5.1 4.7 4.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
3 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
2 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 5.1 4.7 4.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 4.9 4.5 4.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C7: Nominal wages – scenario WTO 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -1.9 -0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 -0.5 -1.4 -2.6 
5 -1.2 -0.1 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.2 -0.7 -2.0 
4 -1.0 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.4 -0.5 -1.8 
3 -1.0 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -1.7 -2.9 
2 -1.3 -0.1 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -1.2 -2.0 -3.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -1.9 -0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.4 -1.9 -2.7 -3.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C8: Welfare (real wages) – scenario WTO 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.6 99.1 100.9 102.1 103.1 103.6 101.8 102.1 101.8 103.9 103.6 102.7 101.3 99.3 96.6 
5 98.1 100.8 102.7 103.9 105.0 105.4 103.6 103.8 103.5 105.6 105.3 104.4 102.9 100.8 98.0 
4 98.7 101.5 103.4 104.7 105.8 106.2 104.3 104.6 104.2 106.3 105.9 105.0 103.5 101.3 98.4 
3 98.7 101.5 103.4 104.7 105.8 106.2 104.3 104.5 104.2 103.8 103.1 101.8 100.5 98.7 96.0 
2 98.1 100.8 102.7 103.9 105.0 105.4 103.6 103.8 103.5 103.1 102.5 101.1 99.9 98.1 95.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.6 99.1 100.9 102.0 103.1 103.6 101.8 102.1 101.8 101.4 100.7 99.5 98.3 96.6 94.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 
5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 
4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 
3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 
2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C9: Nominal wages – scenario Eastern integration (EAST) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 1.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 1.3 1.3 1.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.5 1.4 2.5 
5 0.5 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.7 1.9 
4 0.2 -0.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2 -2.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.1 -0.5 0.4 1.7 
3 0.2 -0.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2 -2.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 1.4 2.6 
2 0.5 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.8 1.7 2.8 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.4 3.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST  
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C10: Welfare (real wages) – scenario Eastern integration (EAST) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.0 98.4 100.0 101.0 101.8 102.0 98.2 98.4 98.0 102.9 102.8 102.2 100.9 99.0 96.4 
5 97.5 100.1 101.8 102.8 103.7 103.8 99.9 100.1 99.7 104.7 104.6 104.0 102.7 100.6 97.9 
4 98.1 100.8 102.6 103.6 104.5 104.6 100.5 100.7 100.2 105.5 105.4 104.7 103.3 101.2 98.4 
3 98.1 100.8 102.6 103.6 104.5 104.6 100.4 100.6 100.2 103.6 103.3 102.3 101.1 99.2 96.6 
2 97.5 100.1 101.8 102.8 103.7 103.8 99.8 100.0 99.6 102.9 102.5 101.6 100.4 98.6 96.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.0 98.4 100.0 101.0 101.8 102.0 98.2 98.4 98.0 101.1 100.7 99.8 98.6 96.9 94.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 
3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.9 
2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C11: Nominal wages – scenario SPATIAL (reduced spatial trade costs) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 -0.5 -1.2 
5 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 -0.2 -0.9 
4 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.8 
3 -0.1 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 -1.4 -1.9 -2.5 
2 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2.9 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 
5 0.9 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.8 
4 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.7 
3 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.4 
2 0.9 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.5 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C12: Welfare – scenario SPATIAL (reduced spatial trade costs) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 103.6 105.1 106.2 107.0 107.6 107.8 103.9 104.1 103.9 107.2 107.0 106.5 105.7 104.4 102.9 
5 104.5 106.1 107.2 108.0 108.6 108.9 104.8 105.0 104.8 108.1 108.0 107.4 106.5 105.2 103.6 
4 104.8 106.4 107.6 108.4 109.1 109.3 105.2 105.4 105.2 108.4 108.2 107.7 106.8 105.5 103.8 
3 104.8 106.4 107.6 108.4 109.1 109.3 105.2 105.4 105.2 105.0 104.5 103.7 102.8 101.7 100.2 
2 104.5 106.1 107.2 108.0 108.6 108.9 104.8 105.0 104.9 104.6 104.2 103.4 102.5 101.4 100.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 103.6 105.1 106.2 107.0 107.6 107.9 103.9 104.1 103.9 103.7 103.3 102.5 101.7 100.7 99.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.8 7.8 
5 7.4 6.4 5.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.4 6.1 7.2 
4 7.1 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.8 5.2 6.0 7.0 
3 7.1 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.0 5.5 6.5 
2 7.3 6.3 5.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.3 7.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C13: Nominal wages – scenario EAST-WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.1 -1.0 -0.2 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -1.2 -2.0 -3.1 
5 -1.5 -0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -1.3 -2.5 
4 -1.2 0.0 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.3 -2.4 
3 -1.2 0.0 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.5 0.9 -2.6 -3.2 -4.2 
2 -1.5 -0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 0.6 -2.8 -3.4 -4.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.2 -1.0 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -3.6 -4.1 -5.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WIDER 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 
5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 
4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 
3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 2.5 2.3 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 
2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 2.5 2.3 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 2.5 2.3 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C14: Welfare (real wages) – scenario EAST-WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.7 99.2 101.0 102.3 103.4 104.0 104.2 104.2 103.7 100.6 100.6 100.1 98.9 97.1 94.6 
5 98.2 100.9 102.8 104.1 105.3 105.9 106.1 106.1 105.5 102.1 102.2 101.6 100.5 98.6 95.9 
4 98.8 101.6 103.6 104.9 106.1 106.7 106.9 106.9 106.4 102.5 102.5 101.9 100.8 98.9 96.2 
3 98.8 101.6 103.6 104.9 106.1 106.8 106.9 106.9 106.4 103.0 101.7 99.9 96.6 95.2 92.8 
2 98.2 100.9 102.8 104.1 105.3 105.9 106.1 106.1 105.7 102.5 101.2 99.4 96.1 94.7 92.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.7 99.2 101.1 102.3 103.5 104.1 104.2 104.3 103.9 100.8 99.6 97.9 94.5 93.2 91.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WIDER 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 
4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 
2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 3.0 2.3 1.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 3.0 2.3 1.7 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C15: Nominal wages – scenario EASTOPEN 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average). NB: Levels with unilaterally higher barriers! 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.6 -2.7 
5 -1.3 -0.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.8 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -1.0 -2.2 
4 -1.0 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.8 -2.0 
3 -1.0 0.1 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 3.7 3.6 3.0 -1.4 -2.2 -3.3 
2 -1.3 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 3.6 3.5 3.0 -1.6 -2.4 -3.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -1.2 2.9 2.8 2.3 -2.3 -3.0 -4.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from high barriers in E2 to scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 
2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 -3.6 -3.8 -3.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 -3.7 -3.8 -3.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C16: Welfare (real wages) – scenario EASTOPEN 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 95.6 97.9 99.6 100.6 101.5 101.8 98.5 98.8 98.5 101.2 101.1 100.4 99.2 97.3 94.7 
5 97.1 99.6 101.3 102.4 103.3 103.5 100.1 100.4 100.1 102.8 102.7 102.0 100.7 98.7 96.0 
4 97.7 100.3 102.1 103.2 104.1 104.3 100.7 101.0 100.7 103.3 103.2 102.4 101.1 99.1 96.4 
3 97.6 100.3 102.1 103.1 104.0 104.3 100.6 100.9 100.6 94.2 93.9 92.8 97.5 95.8 93.4 
2 97.0 99.6 101.3 102.3 103.2 103.5 99.9 100.3 100.0 93.9 93.7 92.6 97.0 95.4 93.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 95.5 97.9 99.6 100.5 101.4 101.7 98.3 98.6 98.3 92.6 92.3 91.3 95.5 94.0 91.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from high barriers in E2 to scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.6 6.3 6.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 
2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.3 5.9 5.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.0 5.7 5.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C17: Nominal wages – scenario CAPITAL 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average).  
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.3 -1.2 -0.4 0.1 0.6 0.8 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 1.0 1.4 0.9 -0.1 -1.3 -2.6 
5 -1.6 -0.5 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 1.7 2.7 1.7 0.5 -0.8 -2.3 
4 -1.4 -0.2 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.9 1.4 0.3 -0.9 -2.3 
3 -1.4 -0.2 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -1.7 -1.7 -2.5 
2 -1.6 -0.4 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 -0.2 0.7 -0.5 -1.4 -0.9 -2.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.3 -1.2 -0.4 0.2 0.7 0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.6 -1.2 -2.1 -2.1 -2.9 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.4 0.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 
4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 
3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.2 0.4 
2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.1 0.9 0.4 -0.1 1.1 0.9 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
 60
 
 
Table C18: Welfare (real wages) – scenario CAPITAL 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 95.1 97.5 99.2 100.3 101.3 101.7 98.8 99.1 98.9 100.5 101.0 99.5 96.9 93.9 90.6 
5 96.6 99.1 100.9 102.1 103.1 103.5 100.4 100.8 100.5 102.5 104.3 101.4 98.4 95.1 91.6 
4 97.2 99.8 101.7 102.9 103.9 104.3 101.0 101.4 101.2 102.1 102.6 101.0 98.3 95.2 91.7 
3 97.2 99.8 101.7 102.9 103.9 104.3 101.0 101.4 101.2 98.4 98.6 96.8 95.1 94.5 91.9 
2 96.6 99.2 101.0 102.2 103.2 103.5 100.4 100.8 100.6 98.6 100.1 97.1 95.5 96.0 92.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 95.1 97.5 99.2 100.4 101.4 101.7 98.8 99.2 98.9 96.7 96.9 95.3 93.8 93.2 90.9 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -1.3 -2.7 -3.8 -4.5 
5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 1.1 -1.0 -2.8 -4.0 -4.8 
4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.7 -1.0 -1.9 -3.2 -4.3 -5.0 
3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -2.4 -1.6 -2.1 -2.7 -1.7 -1.8 
2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.6 0.4 -1.3 -1.8 0.2 -1.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.9 -1.1 -1.6 -2.1 -1.1 -1.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
 
